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HIGH LIGHTS 
• Attacks with fake apps for well-known companies that did not publish a mobile app yet.
• Existing solutions (Androguard and FsQuadra ) cannot addressed this issue.
• A service which is able to successfully detect and prevent such fake apps.
• Evaluation with more than 5000 apps, thus demonstrating its accuracy.
• Able to daily validate ail apps deployed on Google Play or Apple App Store.
ABSTRACT Keywords: 
Mobile apps 
Fake apps 
Oetection A significant amount of apps submitted to mobile market places {MMP) are illegitimate, resulting in a 
negative publicity for these MMPs. To our knowledge, ail scanning solutions in this domain only focus on 
the detection of illegitimate apps which mi mie existing ones. However, recent attack analysis reveal the 
appearance of a new category of victims: enterprises which did not yet publish their app on the MMP. 
Thereby, an attacker may be one step ahead and publish a malicious app using the graphie identity of a 
trusted enterprise. Famous enterprises such as Blackberry, Netflix, and Niantic {Pokemon Go) have been 
subject of such attacks. We designed and implemented a security check system called IMAD (lllegitimate 
Mobile App Detector) which is able to limit aforementioned attacks. The evaluation results show that 
1. Introduction
Persona! computers changed our world a lot in the last decades. 
Computer applications (apps) automated many of the complex and 
challenging tasks previously accomplished by human brain. How­
ever, not ail computer apps are beneficial. Among them, there is 
also an important number of malicious apps ( the recent WannaCry 
virus has infected thousands and thousands of computers across 
the world [ 1 )). For several reasons, the attackers are increasingly 
attracted by mobile platforms. First, in comparison with a desktop 
machine, a mobile device has more peripherals ( e.g. accelerometer, 
GPS, proximity sensor, camera, etc.) which generate more inter­
esting data for an attacker. Second, a mobile device has access to 
a mobile network where overtaxed numbers may be exploited in 
order to increase the attacker's revenue. 
Nowadays, the vast majority of mobile apps are made available 
to users through digital distribution platforms called mobile mar­
ket places (MMP) such as Google Play for Android and App Store for 
Apple. These main MMPs host a tremendous amount of apps. For 
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IMAD can protect companies from such attacks with an acceptable error rate and at a low cost for MMPs.  
example, Google Play has more than 3.3 million (2) apps and over 
50 billion downloads (3). Considering this plethora of MMP 
apps, it becomes fairly difficult for a malicious app to be visible 
enough to be downloaded. Thereby, they try to associate 
themselves with well-known public entities. A study from a 
security company (4) revealed that around 77% of the most 
downloaded apps have at least one illegitimate version. To 
cope with them, several app scan solutions have been 
investigated and integrated into MMPs ( e.g. Bouncer at Google). 
To our knowledge, scanning solutions for illegitimate apps only 
focus on the detection of apps which mimic existing ones. 
However, recent attack analysis reveal the arrivai of a new victim 
category. Attackers develop and publish mobile apps for 
well-known companies which did not publish a mobile app 
yet. ln 2013, the Blackberry messenger has been a victim of such 
an attack where an illegitimate app has been published on 
Google Play and downloaded about 100k rimes before its 
removal. More recently (September 14, 2016), Pokemon Go has 
also been attacked in the same way; see the following post (5): 
"Afew days ago we reported to Goog/e the existence of a new 
malidous app in the Goog/e Play Store. The Trojan presented itself 
as the "Guide for Pok.emon Go". According to the Goog/e Play Store 
it has been down/oaded more than 500,000 times ... Kaspersk.y Lab 
products detect the Trojan as 
HEUR:Trojan.AndroidOS.Ztorg.ad. At least one other version of this
particular app was available through Google Play in July 2016.". The
French Telecommunication company Orange has announced the
development of a mobile money service called Orange Bank [6]
which will be available throughout a mobile app this summer. We
have successfully experimented the publication of an illegitimate
version of that app on a popular MMP and several downloads have
been observed.1
This paper presents IMAD (Illegitimate Mobile App Detector), a
solution for detecting this new category of illegitimate apps at sub-
mission time (when the developer uploads the app in theMMP). To
our knowledge, this is the first research work which investigates
this issue. The main principle is to identify, from visible charac-
teristics of the app (e.g., name or logo), the trusted entity (e.g., a
company) associatedwith these characteristics. This trusted entity
is either the submitter or the one the submitter wants to mimic.
This identified entity is then contacted by email to validate the app
submission. The implementation of IMAD raises several challenges.
The most important among them is the following: how to identify
the trusted entity associated with an app regarding the number
of worldwide trusted entities? IMAD answers this question by
relying on the biggest database in the world which is Google (its
search engine). Our basic idea is to combine several standard text
and image similarity checking in order to find from the internet
the legitimate and trusted entity behind each submitted app (its
visible characteristics). Although this idea appears simple to label,
its implementation is not easy. The evaluation of IMAD with more
than 5000 apps (from AndroZoo [7] and Contagio [8], among other
data sets) demonstrates the effectiveness of our approach, with
an acceptable margin of error: almost nil on legitimate apps and
less than 20% on illegitimate apps. Overall, this paper makes the
following contributions:
(1) We highlighted a new security problem which affects all
MMPs: the apps presented under the image of awell-known
public entity which does not have a mobile app yet.
(2) We presented an algorithm which is able to successfully
detect and prevent the above problematic situation. We
provide IMAD, a prototype which is easy to exploit and to
integrate with existing MMPs.
(3) We evaluated IMAD with more than 5000 apps, covering all
enterprise categories (geographical location, activity, etc.).
The evaluation results show that IMAD can protect both big,
small and medium-sized companies from such attacks. In
addition, our system is able to validate all apps deployed
within a day onGoogle Play or Apple App Store for aminimal
cost (about $1,755).
(4) We compared IMAD with existing solutions (namely An-
droguard [9] and FsQuadra [10]) which confirmed that the
studied issue cannot be addressed using current approaches.
We showed that IMAD is also able to detect illegitimate
situations handled by existing solutions.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. A review of the
related work is presented in Section 2. Section 3 defines the con-
cepts used in this work. It also presents the motivations. Section 4
presents our contributions while Section 5 presents evaluation
results. Finally, we present our conclusion in Section 6.
2. Related work
Many studies contributed to the issue of detecting illegitimate
apps. The proposed approaches can be classified according to three
main criteria:
1 This experiment was validated by the ethics commission from our laboratory.
Where: the place where detection takes place. Detection can be
initiated in the MMP where the app is deployed, or on the mobile
terminal where the app is installed.
When: the time when detection is performed. Detection can be
performed statically: an analysis of the app’s installation files. It
can also be performed dynamically when the app is launched
(either in the MMP or on the mobile terminal).
How: the employed detectionmethod. We classify these methods
into two groups: those which attempt to detect internal abnormal
or suspicious characteristics within the app (e.g., abnormal com-
munications), and thosewhich attempt to detect fake apps through
similaritieswith legitimate apps (e.g., based on images or logos).
These criteria logically lead (according to the place/time/
method) to the following classes of solutions:
MMP/static/internal. Solutions in this class rely on the analysis
of app installation files when apps are published in the MMP. An
example is described in [11] where they analyse the control flow
in the app code in order to detect malicious behaviours.
MMP/static/similarities. Solutions in this class aim at detecting
similarities between suspicious apps (fake apps) and legitimate
apps already published in the MMP. Such similarities may be de-
tected from document files (text, images) packedwith the app [12]
or from its code [13–15].
MMP/dynamic/internal. In this class, solutions rely on a dynamic
analysis, i.e., they execute the app before effectively publishing
it in the MMP. This execution is a means to observe the internal
behaviour of the app. For instance in [16], they observe runtime
communications in order to detect connections with malicious
sites.
MMP/dynamic/similarities. In this class, solutions are looking for
similarities with existing apps in the MMP to detect fake apps, but
dynamically before publishing. In [17], they analyse at runtime
apps’ GUI (inside the MMP) in order to classify apps and detect
similarities.
Mobile/static/internal. Solutions in this class rely on static detec-
tions when the app is installed on the device, as does Android
bouncer [18] with electronic signatures.
Mobile/dynamic/internal. Dynamic solutions are also proposed
on the device. For instance, [19] verifies that the name of the app
(captured from its graphical user interface at runtime) is consistent
with the communication endpoints (URLs) used by the app. Also,
several solutions [11,20,21] introduce indicators (for instance an
image) chosen by userswhen a (known) legitimate app is installed.
If an app imitates a legitimate appwithout presenting the indicator
(in its GUI), the user knows the app is illegitimate.
All these contributions aim at detecting illegitimate apps in an
MMP or on a mobile terminal. The detection may be performed
statically by analysing the installation files of the app or dynami-
cally by observing the app’s behaviour. As presented in Table 1 The
detection either identifies a malicious behaviour within the app or
identifies a similarity with a legitimate app. Detecting malicious
behaviours within apps is limited because it is difficult to cover all
attacks (and avoid false negatives). Similarity detection appears to
be more promising.
Our solution falls into this latter category. However, it does not
rely on the detection of pre-identified characteristics (e.g., from the
GUI) from already published apps, which would limit its coverage.
It detects all attacks, including those targeting apps which do not
yet have a mobile version published in an MMP.
Table 1
Drawbacks and advantages of related work solutions compared to IMAD.
How Similarities Internal IMAD
Where MMP Mobile MMP Mobile
Independent of store data ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
Independent of store applications ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓
Independent of the location ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓
Independent of the attack mecanism ✓ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✓
3. Definitions and motivations
3.1. Definitions
Trusted entity. We define a trusted entity as an enterprise or an
institution which is recognized by a government authority (gener-
ally through a unique identification number). In this paper, we are
interested in apps which belong to trusted entities, not to private
holders. Let us call T the set of existing trusted entities.
Graphic identity (noted GI). The GI of a trusted entity T (respec-
tively an app A) is the set of visual elements which refer to T
(respectively A) without confusion. Most of the time, the GI of an
app is included within the GI of the trusted entity which possesses
the app. The GI of a trusted entity may be its name, logo or any
image which refers to one of its services.
Trusted developer and the attacker. Let us consider an app A,
implemented by a developer D. The latter is said to be a trusted
developer if the trusted entity T which is behind the GI of A recog-
nizes D, otherwise D is considered to be an attacker. Knowing that
in some cases (which are extremely rare because entities generally
try to define GI so that they are unique) several entities may have
similar GI, we consider that the trusted entity behind a GI is the
most popular one.
Legitimate and illegitimate app (respectively noted L and I). An
app is said to be legitimate if it has been published by a trusted
developer, otherwise the app is illegitimate. Notice that the illegit-
imacy of an app is independent from the developer intent. It means
that an illegitimate app is not necessarily dangerous from the user
point of view. However, it is from the point of view of the trusted
entity because it is steering its users. For instance the Orange Cache
Cleaner app (a small tool used for clearing application cached
files) could be considered illegitimate because its GI refers to the
famous enterprise Orange (the French telecommunication com-
pany), especially its service Orange Cash. From this definition, one
can easily understand why legitimate/illegitimate app detection
systems mainly rely on GI analysis.
Malware and Safe app (respectively noted M and S). An app is
said to be a malware if it does actions without the initial approba-
tion of the user, otherwise the app is said to be safe. Subsequently,
malware detection systems mainly study the behaviour of the app.
3.2. Research scope
According to the above definitions, apps can be classified into
four categories2: L ∩ S, L ∩ M , I ∩ S, and I ∩ M . Except the
former category, all the others consist of what we call bad apps
(towards the user or a trusted entity). MMP operators try to avoid
the publication of bad apps on their platforms. Therefore, before
being published, each submitted app is subject to several security
checks that can be synthesized in two steps (see Fig. 1): GI anal-
ysis (for detecting illegitimate apps) and behaviour checking (for
2 For instance, L ∩ S means the intersection of Legitimate and Safe apps.
detecting malware). Apps which fail one of these controls are kept
within a dedicated storage for further studies (e.g. for improving
the detection systems). An app is published only if it satisfies all
the security checks. In this paper, we only focus on the detection
of illegitimate apps, which are the basis of phishing attacks [16].
Thus, malware detection is out of scope for this paper. The next
section summarizes the current state of the research in this domain
in order to highlight our specific contribution. For illustration, we
consider Android apps, although our contribution can be applied
to other app types.
3.3. Problematic
Let us note A the set of downloadable/published apps in the
MMP. Let us note Apub an app under the submission process. Exist-
ing illegitimate app detection solutions can be organized into three
classes:
(1) source code analysis [11,14]: they check if there is an app in
A whose implementation structure (especially its graphical
user interface) is similar to the one of Apub.
(2) image analysis [12,15]: they check if there is an app in A
which uses the similar images as Apub.
(3) and app name analysis [20]: they check if there is an app in
Awhose name is similar to Apub.
As we can see, all these solutions only focus on detecting if Apub
is similar to an existing app. More formally, they answer the
following question: (Q1) ∃A ∈ A (within the MMP), such that
Apub’s GI is close to A’s GI?
We claim that answering (Q1) does not allow to cover all ille-
gitimate apps at submission time. Consider the situationwhere the
attacker implements Apub as a service of a trusted entitywhich has
not yet published a mobile version of its service. The fraudulent
nature of Apub will not be detected by current solutions. Fig. 2.a
presents the list of apps suggested by Google play when the user is
looking for an IEEE app. This suggestion list could have been the
one presented in Fig. 2.b, which includes two illegitimate apps:
EasyChair (faking the legitimate conference management system
EasyChair [22]) and ACM EuroSys (faking the EuroSys conference
management system). This situation may occur in current MMPs
because the legitimate organization behind EasyChair for example
has not yet published a mobile app version of the system.3 For
example, the attacker could obtain the username and the password
of the conference reviewers. Therefore, their reviews could be the
subject to Man-in-the-Middle attacks. Another illegitimate situ-
ation we experimented concerns the french telecommunication
company Orange. The latter has announced the arrival of a mobile
money app called Orange Bank [6] this year. Our team has devel-
oped and successfully published on a popular MMP4 an app which
purports to be Orange Bank. This situation could have been very
problematic for the legitimate company and its clients in the case
of a real attacker. Notice that we have unpublished the app after
one month so as to avoid exposure to legal proceedings.
Considering the large success of smartphones combined with
the trend of converting computer applications to mobile apps, this
problem is crucial. Therefore, illegitimate app detection systems
should not limit their checks to the GIs within the MMP. More
formally, instead of answering (Q1) as current researchers do, we
answer the following question: (Q2) ∃T ∈ T (worldwide), such
that Apub’s GI is close to T’s GI? This is a very difficult problem.
This paper presents (for the first time) a solution to this issue.
3 Notice that it totally makes sense to have the mobile version of these apps. It
would be useful for conference organizers.
4 The name of the MMP is not revealed in order to avoid negative publicity.
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4. IMAD: lllegitimate Mobile App Detector
4.1. Overall system design 
This paper presents IMAD, a solution for detecting illegitimate 
apps at publication time. Its works as follows, summarized in 
Fig. 3. Once the app is uploaded, IMAD builds its GI, noted Gl....Apub· 
Then it peiforms a set of web searches (on the internet), analysed 
with standard machine learning techniques using each element in 
Gl....Apub in order to find the trusted entity behind Gl....Apub· This is 
the core of our solution. We assume that any trusted entity can be 
found on the web.5 If the result of the previous step reveals the
presence of at least one trusted entity ( noted T), a validation email 
is sent to it and a countdown is armed. The app is considered to be 
illegitimate if IMAD does not receive a validation email before the 
end of the countdown. Notice that if the developer is legitimate, 
thus the trusted entity will waiting for the validation email sent by 
IMAD. 
IMAD can be deployed in two manners: directly within a spe­
cific MMP or deployed as an independent service (IMAD as a 
5 One may ask why notjustgerring the contact orr rrom the submirrer in order 
ro accelerate searches. This would not be secure because our system does not trust 
the developer, who could be an arracker. 
Service or IMADaaS). We consider this latter case because it is 
the most generic one. Therefore, once an MMP is registered as an 
IMADaaS customer, it can automatically forward ail received apk 
(Android Package Kit - we mainly experimented with Android 
apps) to IMADaaS for checking. Upon receiving the checking result, 
the MMP can apply its internai checking system (see Fig. 1). 
The implementation of IMAD raises several challenges. The 
most important among them are: ( 1) Trusted entity determination: 
how to caver ail trusted entities which exist throughout the world? 
How to obtain their GI, knowing that there is no database which 
includes them? (2) GI comparison: how to identify, with as less 
errors as possible, the proximity between Gis? How to minimize 
bath the false positive and false negative rates? (3) Scalability: 
the time, the amount of resources as well as the cost required for 
exploiting IMAD should be acceptable. The next sections details 
each IMAD's component while tackling the above challenges. To 
facilitate reading, difficult concepts are introduced (when needed) 
and followed by illustrations. The latter are based on the illegiti­
mate EasyChair app presented in the previous section. 
4.2. Graphie identity (GI) construction 
IMAD considers the following elements as part of Gl....Apub: the 
name of the app (noted appName) and its logo. These elements are 
Graphie ldentlty construction 
appN 
app ogo 
Trusted entity search 
Fig. 3. IMAD generat runcrioning. 
chosen because they are those which mainly influence the user's 
decision in the process of associating an app with a trusted entity. 
Concerning the name, we consider two versions: the one given by 
the developer (called appName v1 in Fig. 3), and the other overlaid 
onto the logo ( called appName v2 in Fig. 3). This second version is 
important because sometimes the attacker can provide a bizarre 
name, knowing that the relevant one is well visible on the logo. 
The extraction of ail these elements is straightforward. We use 
apktool (23] to extract both appName v1 and the logo from the apk. 
Then we use tesseract-ocr (24), an optical character reader system 
(OCR in Fig. 3), to extract appName v2. Applied to our illustrative 
example, appNamev1 could be "BXdFcGKfpl" while appName v2 is 
"EC EasyChair" ( refer to the logo in Fig. 2.b ). 
4.3. Trusted entity search 
After the construction of the submitted app's GI (noted GL..Apub), 
IMAD has to find the trusted entity (if exists) which is behind 
the name or the logo of the app. Our basic idea is to rely on 
the web (especially the Google custom search engine) in order to 
consider ail trusted entities. ln fact, we assume that attackers only 
target trusted entities which are known by a significant number 
of persons, and we are betting that such entities are indexed by 
Google. Each element of GL..Apub is used as a search criteria, ail 
searches being performed in parallel. Therefore, we distinguish 
two search types: 
• text search: performed on appName v1 and appName v2, see
Sections 4.4-4.9.
• image search: performed on the logo, see Section 4.10. This 
step exploits almost the same algorithms as the text search.
4.4. Text search (based on appName) 
The main difficulty is to filter from the search results ail pages 
which are not directly related to the official website of the trusted 
entity behind appName. To this end, we use a five-step algorithm, 
summarized in Fig. 4: 
• (1) collection of web pages which relate to appName;
• (2) organization of web pages into clusters according to the
topic they deal with;
• (3) elimination of clusters whose topic does not relate to a
trusted entity, the rest are merged;
• (4) elimination of pages which are not directly related to
appName (non official pages, youtube pages, press articles,
etc.);
• (5) extraction of the contact (email) of the trusted entity.
4.5. Web page collection 
We rely on the Google Custom Search framework (25) to per­
form this task. Google's A Pis can be used for programming custom 
Google searches. The result of a search is a list of items which 
represent web pages. Each returned item is composed (among 
others) of a title, a brief description of the web page, and a link to its 
HTML content. ln the case of IMAD, we have experimentally seen 
that the first 20 items are sufficient (see the evaluation section). 
From each item, IMAD builds what we call a doaiment ( noted doc)
by concatenating the name, the description and the HTML content. 
Each document then goes through few changes (such as conversion 
to lower-case, elimination of HTML tags and stop words, etc.) in 
order to facilitate the next steps. The obtained set of documents 
is called the corpus. Notice that documents which contain very 
few information (such as 404 pages) are removed from the corpus. 
Fig. 5 presents the corpus built from our illustrative example. 
4.6. Clustering 
lntuitively, clustering consists in gathering documents from the 
corpus which nearly have the same group of words ( the application 
of this step to our illustrative example is presented in Fig. 6). 
To this end, we used the k-means clustering algorithm. K-means 
works on vectors while we deal with a corpus. Severa( studies have 
investigated the issue of corpus vectorization. IMAD uses Vector 
Space Mode( [26), a widely used solution. 
A dictionary. This solution is based on a dictionary (noted V =
{ w1, ... , wn}) which includes the words from the corpus. Naively, 
we could use ail the words that appear at least once in the whole 
corpus. This would result in a very large dictionary which could 
impact the execution of the k-means algorithm. ln IMAD, we only 
consider words that appear at least once in all document titles 
and descriptions. The HTML content, which is the largest part of 
a document is ignored. This solution is acceptable because the 
relevant words of a web page are either in its title or its description. 
Vectorization. The basic idea is to transform each document do9 
(1 � j � m. m is the number of documents in the corpus) into a 
n-sized vector (noted vec_do9), n be the size of the dictionary. The
ith coefficient of vec_do9 is also called the coefficient of w; in do9.
lt is noted Coefîj and it evaluates the importance of the word for
characterizing the document.
Coefîj is computed using the TF-IDF (Term Frequency-lnverse 
Document Frequency) standard, as follows: 
Coefü = tfü x idf; (1) 
where tf;J is the occurrence frequency of w; in do9, and id/; =
log( {ff: ), with m; be the number of documents containing at least 
once �i- Roughly, the higher the occurrence frequency of the word 
in the document, the higher its coefficient. However, the word is 
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penalized if it appears in most of the documents, as it would not be 
relevant to characterize a specific document. 
handle this issue. K-means++ is able to choose a satisfying value 
(not necessarily the optimal one) for the initial centre. 
K sening. K-means requires the number of clusters (k) as an input 
parameter. (27) proposes a way to calculate k in the context of 
corpus clustering. lt computes k as follows: 
k=f
mxn
l 
t 
(2) 
Where t is the number of non-zero coefficients in the TF-IDF matrix 
( the stack of ail vec_doq ). 
K-means initialization. K-means also requires the initial position
of the centre of the clusters as an input parameter. A wrong ini­
tialization could lead to a wrong result. We use k-means++ [28) to
4.7. Irrelevant cluster elimination 
The goal of this step is to discard clusters whose topie does not 
refer to a trusted entity ( e.g. the third cluster in our illustrative 
example). To this end, we implement the following idea. Each clus­
ter's topie is determined and used to query an accessible database 
of trusted entities, allowing a score to be assigned to the tapie, 
indicating to what extend it is related to a trusted entity. Tuen, 
only clusters whose score exceeds a threshold (determined exper­
imentally) are kept. The challenge here is threefold: cluster's tapie 
determination, finding an accessible database of trusted entities,
and determination of an accurate scoring function (noted S).
Topic determination.Given a cluster C, we consider its topic being
the list of words which summarizes themain idea developed by all
its documents. We call these words important words (noted CIW ).
CIW is computed using the Vector Space Modeling of the cluster.
This time, however, the TF standard (Term Frequency) is used
instead of TF–IDF as previously. The TF standard is suitable here
because we are looking for important words.
Accessible database of trusted entities. The subtle way we adopt
is to rely on the two biggest semantic databases that exist:
Wikipedia-dbPedia [29] and the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization (WIPO) [30]. We implement a set of tools for accessing
these databases. In this paper we focus on Wikipedia-dbPedia for
illustration. Let us say a few words about wikipedia-dbPedia, nec-
essary for understanding our solution.Wikipedia is a participatory-
controlled semantic database composed of web pages, called
wiki concepts. DbPedia is a structured version of wikipedia in
which each wiki concept is characterized using several criteria.
Among these criteria, the category allows to know if awiki concept
refers to a trusted entity or not. For instance, the category values
‘‘Company’’, ‘‘Organization’’ or ‘‘Business’’ refer to a trusted entity.
A wiki concept is also associated to an abstract which quickly
describes it.
Cluster scoring.Given a cluster C, its importantwords CIW are used
to compute its score, as follows:
S(C) = max
wi∈CIW
(S1(wi)) (3)
where S1(wi) is the score of wi, computed in this way:
S1(wi) = max
wck∈WCi
(S2(wck)) (4)
where WCi is the set of wiki concepts related to wi. WCi is ob-
tained by enforcing a Google search only on wikipedia pages (‘‘wi
site:en.wikipedia.org’’). The first 10 resulting items are used for
extractingWCi’s elements.
Concerning S2(wck), it depends on bothwck itself and the stud-
ied cluster C because two constraints should be respected: (i) If
wck refers to a trusted entity (whatever it is), S2(wck) has to be
high; (ii) Ifwck is unrelated to C, S2(wck) has to be low. This second
constraint allows to minimize the false positive rate. For instance,
if the topic of a cluster deals with ‘‘Orange’’ (the fruit), the wiki
concept ‘‘Orange SA’’ (which is an enterprise) must have a low
score. In summary, we compute S2(wck) as follows:
S2(wck) = δ(wck)+ σ (wck) (5)
with δ(wck) be the trusted entity closeness coefficient and σ (wck)
the cluster closeness coefficient. To compute δ(wck), we build
a textbook (called the Rescued Category List, RCL) consisting of
dbPedia categorywordswhich characterize a trusted entity (‘‘Com-
pany’’, ‘‘Organization’’, ‘‘Business’’, etc.) so that: δ(wck) = 1 if the
category of wck appears in the textbook; δ(wck) = 0 otherwise.
Note that in our textbook, only categories referring to compa-
nies were considered. We focused on companies since they are
the main targets of attackers. However the textbook can be easily
enrichedwith the lexical fields ofmany other types of organization
such as universities and governments agencies.
About σ (wck), we use the cosine similarity [31], which allows to
estimate the distance between two texts. In our case, these texts
are: the abstract of the wiki concept (noted abs_wck), compared
with each document in the cluster. Therefore,
σ (wck) =
∑mC
i=1 cosine(abs_wck, doci)
mC
.
The application of this step to the illustrative example is as
follows. Fig. 7 presents the important words of the illustrative
clusters. We can see that only the first two clusters are related to
trusted entities: EasyChair (the conference management system)
and Ikea (furnishing trader).
4.8. Irrelevant document elimination
At this stage, all remaining clusters are merged in order to
form a unique cluster. The purpose of this step is to focus only on
the documents which directly belong to the trusted entity behind
appName. To this end, we discard all documents whose domain
name is not phonetically close to at least one word of appName.
For instance, the document doc2 in the illustrative example does
not belong to EasyChair, thus it should be discarded. We choose
the domain name because most of the time the company name
is used as the basis for building its domain name. We combine
two methods to achieve this step: a metaphone algorithm [32] (it
assigns to a given string a key indicating its pronunciation) and a
string distance algorithm [33] (it compares two strings). Our idea
is to first compute the metaphone key of the domain name (noted
MKdm) and each appName’s word wi (noted MKwi ). Thereby, we
compute the string distance betweenMKdm and eachMKwi (noted
sdi). Further, it is normalized so that sdi = 0 means the two
keys match perfectly. Therefore, if ∃ i so that sdi is smaller than
a configured threshold (we experimentally found that 0.3 is a good
value, see the evaluation section), the domain name’s document
is kept. Fig. 8 presents the retained documents in the case of the
illustrative example.
If the previous step provides no trusted entity, the discarded
documents are given a second chance. Indeed, it is possible that
an enterprise sells several products whose names are phonetically
different from the name of the enterprise (thus its domain name).
For instance, the URL of the official website of the famous video
game ‘‘Diablo 3’’ is ‘‘http://eu.battle.net/d3’’. These cases are rare
but exists. They include a category of enterprises that we call cata-
logue enterprises (they offer a catalogue of products). The purpose
of the second chance step is to recover them. To this end,we exploit
again dbPedia’swiki concept categories (see Section 4.7) as follows.
Webuild a textbook (called theRescuedCategory List, RCL) consist-
ing of dbPedia categories (‘‘DRM_for_Windows’’, ‘‘DRM_for_OS_X’’,
etc.) which characterize a catalogue entity. Therefore, all domain
nameswhosewiki concept category is part of the RCL are kept. The
evaluation results show that this strategy is fairly effective.
4.9. Trusted entity’s name and contact extraction
At this stage, the remaining documents (if exist) belong to the
trusted entity which is behind appName. The objective of this step
is to determine the contacts of this entity. To this end, we exploit
a technique similar to the one described by Google [34]. In fact,
websites are usually very clear about who created the content.
There are many reasons for this: copyrighted material protection,
businesses want users to know who they are, etc. Therefore, most
websites have a contact page (‘‘contact us’’, ‘‘about us’’ or just
‘‘about’’), copyright information, or include HTMLmetadata which
provide contact information. In nearly 100% of the cases, the com-
pany email address is successfully obtained (see the evaluation
section). Then, a validation email is sent to the trusted entity
and a counter-down is armed. If no response email is received,
we suppose the app is illegitimate. The response email should
imperatively respect a given format so that it can be parsed by
our framework. Notice that if the app is legitimate, the trusted
entity will be waiting for the email and will provide a response.
For big companies which are subject to several faking, thus will
receive a lot of emails, one may think that they will be lost in a
Cluster1 's important words 
eas chair , conference , suoscr il:ie , si n , mana ement 
Cluster2 's important words 
iléea , nolm r a  , cliair , l:iircb , veneer 
Cluster3 's important words 
chair eas)', media, cardiff , suppl)' 
Fig. 7. The imporra nt words of the cluscers prese nted in Fig. 6. 
oct httE: // easychair. org/ 
Fig. 8. The remaining docume nts arter eliminatin g chose which are noc relaced co EasyChair. 
myriad of emails. This issue can be easily handled with an email 
filter. We provide IMAD with such a component which can be easily 
integrated with popular mail readers. 
To circumvent such a validation scheme, an attacker would 
have to create a fake web site and to exploit search engine op­
timization to augment the visibility of the web site, so that it 
becomes more visible than to web site of the company it attacks. 
Such an attack would be so visible that it would be easily observed 
and detected by the attacked company (its image is being stolen) 
which could take counter-measures. Generally, attackers prefer 
not to behave this way and to remain hidden. 
4.10. Image search (based on the logo) 
IMAD also leverages the logo of the app (noted appLogo) for 
determining its trusted entity. To this end, we rely on two obser­
vations. (1) A logo is strongly linked with a unique app or trusted 
entity. lt is precisely its main purpose. For instance, IJ uniquely
refers to Facebook, the famous social network. (2) The logo of an 
app is strongly linked with the trusted entity which possesses it. 
For instance, IJ is the logo of both the Facebook corporation and
its social network app. We again use Google Custom Search Engine, 
more precisely its reverse image search system, for achieving this 
task. By performing a Google search with appLogo, we are almost 
sure to find the trusted entity among the first items. An item here 
can be of two types: images which are similar to the logo and 
websites which include the logo. We only consider the second 
type. Now, the main question is: how to select from the resulting 
websites the real owner of appLogo? To answer this question we 
implement a six-step algorithm. 
Step 1: Construct the corpus, in the same way as presented in 
Section 4.5. 
Step 2: Determine the topic of each document doq of the corpus, 
as presented in Section 4.6 (Topic determination). 
Step 3: Eliminate ail documents whose topic is not referring to a 
trusted entity, as presented in Section 4.7 (Cluster scoring). 
Step 4: Let us note E; the owner of doc;. Search "the E; logo" on the 
web. According to the Google ranking system, it is very likely that 
the logo of E; is among the first x returned images. We empirically 
determined that x = 30 is fairly sufficient. 
Step 5: Compare appLogo with each obtained image, using [35). 
The latter takes into account several image modifications (rotation, 
scaling, etc.). The algorithm assigns a rank r; to every matched 
image appLogo. 
Step 6: Choose E;, so that r; is the smallest rank. Therefore, E; is the 
trusted entity which owns appLogo. Its document doc; is used for 
extracting its contact, as presented in Section 4.9. 
5. Evaluations
This section presents the evaluation results. We evaluated IMAD 
from the following perspectives: 
• the accuracy: is IMAD able to accurately detect the legitimate
entity behind an app's GI?
• the scalability: how much resources IMAD consumes?
• the cost: how much money is needed to exploit IMAD?
5.1. Experimental environment 
The experiments have been realized on two commodity ma­
chines, each composed of 4 CPUs (Intel Core i5-3337U, 1.80 GHz), 4 
GB memory, an Intel Corporation 3rd Gen Core processor Graphies 
Controller, and a Gigabit Ethernet card RTI.8111/8168/8411 PCI 
Express. One machine hosts IMAD while the other machine runs 
a mail server and our mail filter, emulating what should happen in 
an enterprise. We built a data set playing the role of apps which are 
in the publication process. This data set is composed of 5000 apps, 
organized as follows: 
• D1: includes safe apps gathered from Androzoo [7) and Con­
tagio (8), two popular data sets. These apps are collected from
several sources, including Google Play.
• Di: includes illegitimate apps from Androzoo and Contagio.
The latter analyse ail apps they collected using dilferent An­
tiVirus products. Every app in Di has its safe version in D1 .
• D3 : includes apps we developed for the purpose of this paper
(e.g. Orange Bank) in order to cover ail company types (see
below).
These apps have been selected so that ail company types are 
represented, according to the following criteria: 
• the size: big enterprises (BE), and small and medium-sized
enterprises (SME).
• the location: developed countries (DC), and emerging coun­
tries (EC).
• the activity: catalogue enterprises which are generally gam­
ing companies (GC), and non catalogue enterprises (NGC).
• the name: polysemous (PN) and non polysemous (NPN).
For instance, "Bank of America" is a big enterprise (BE) located in 
a developed country (DC): it is not a gaming company (NGC) and 
its name con tains polysemous words (NPN). lt is said to be of type 
BE_D(_NG(_PN. Types are equally represented in the data set. 
5.2. Accuracy 
The accuracy of our system depends on the accuracy of each 
step it is composed of, namely: (Si ) GI construction, (S2) trusted 
entity search, and (S3) contact extraction. (S2), as well as (S3), has
three versions in respect with the three elements which compose
the GI (appName v1, appName v2, and appLogo). Therefore, (Sij)
corresponds to the jth version of (Si). The evaluation protocol we
put in place is as follows.Wemanually inspected each app in order
to report the expected output of each step. Thus, the actual outputs
obtained during the execution of IMAD are compared with the
expected values. The accuracy of (Si) is only accounted if (Si−1)
was accurate. We also evaluated the accuracy of the entire system.
The latter is accurate when the output of at least one path (among
S1 → S21 → S31, S1 → S22 → S32, and S1 → S23 → S33)
corresponds to what we manually found.6
The evaluation includes two experiment types, differing from
each other by the considered data set:
• The first experiment type allows to evaluate how IMAD be-
haves facing safe apps (GI elements have been built without
having a malicious idea in mind). We relied on D1 and D3.
• The second experiment type allows to evaluate how IMAD
behaves facing illegitimate apps. We relied on D1.
The first experiment type. Fig. 9 presents the evaluation results,
interpreted as follows. (1) The 100% accuracy rate observed in
S1 and S3 validates the methodologies we use for extracting GI
elements from the apk and contacts from web pages. (2) S2 is
the most critical step. (3) Both S21 (based on appName v1) and
S23 (based on appLogo) succeed to identify big companies. This is
explained by the fact that such companies are well indexed by
Google, both their name and logo are popular. (4) The accuracy of
S23 extends to other company types. This is explained by the fact
that the logo is generally built in such away as to return to a unique
company. (5) S21 sometimes fails to identify companies which
belong to the SME category because they are not so famous as big
companies. However, we observed that EC-SME are well identified
in comparison with DC-SME. Indeed, it is more difficult to identify
a small company in the crowded market of a developed country.
This is not the case for an EC-SME which has fewer competitors,
thus a better Google index ranking. (6) We also observed that the
accuracy of S21 is low on apps which belong to countries using a
non-Latin alphabet (e.g. Arabic, Mandarin). This situation does not
concern big companies of these countries because they most of
the time provide an English version of their web site. To validate
this observation, we integrate to IMAD a Mandarin string distance
algorithm [36]. Then we repeated the previous experiments. We
observed the improvement of S21 which minimal accuracy rate
jumps from about 75% to 93%. The integration of other alphabets
to IMAD would nullify the remaining error rate. This is subject of
future work. (7) The accuracy of S22 (based on appName v2) is low
because the text extracted from the logo is sometimes completely
different from the company name. (8) Considering the fact that at
least one IMAD’s path is always accurate (the appLogo path), IMAD
is accurate too.
The second experiment type. We also evaluated IMAD with il-
legitimate apps. Fig. 10 presents the evaluation results. We only
focus on the second step. The following observations can be made
from these results. (1) S21 leads to the lowest accuracy rate, near
zero. This is explained by the fact that attackers generally use
bizarre names [37], knowing that the right name is overlaid onto
the logo. (2) This is why S22 and S23 provide better accuracy rates
(more than 80%). (3) Therefore, the average accuracy rate of the
entire system is about 80%, which is quite high. This is not so
high as with safe apps because some attackers use sophisticated
6 We send a validation email to the 3 identified trusted entities and consider
the app submission is validated if one of these 3 contacts responds. Therefore, we
consider that the approach is accurate if one of the 3 used methods is successful.
Table 2
List of the most important parameters used by IMAD.
Purpose Value
L1: Selection of documents which contain exploitable information 20
L2: Selection of clusters whose topic relates to a trusted entity 1
L3: Selection of important words 10
L4: Selection of domain names which are phonetically close to appName 0.3
mechanisms for building the GI. For instance, it can be built at
runtimebydownloading a remote bitmap,making offline solutions
inefficient. To handle such cases, we improved IMAD as follows.
Optimization: screen-shots analysis. We improved the GI con-
struction step by extracting salient objects (those onwhich the hu-
man visual systempaysmore attention) from the first screen of the
app. To do so, IMAD runs the app in an emulator and captures the
first screen-shot, which has been proven to be enough for identi-
fying an app [38,39]. Having the screen-shot, we use the algorithm
proposed by [35] to extract salient objects. Since not all salient
objects are important (e.g. object which represents a text field), we
discard all objects representing components which are commonly
used in forms (text field, list, checkbox, etc.). The remaining objects
are used for performingweb searches. The evaluation results of this
optimization reveal a negligible improvement, less than 3%. This is
due to the low accuracy of the salient object extraction algorithm.7
Notice that salient object extraction is a recent and hot topic in the
multimedia domain. The evaluation results presented in the next
sections rely on IMAD without this optimization.
5.2.1. Comparison with existing solutions
We compared IMADwith two reference illegitimate app detec-
tion systems which cover all the existing approaches (Section 3.3):
source code analysis, image analysis, and app name analysis. The
former is provided by Androguard [9] while the two others are
provided by FsQuadra [10]. Recall that the basic idea behind exist-
ing solutions consists in comparing the submitted app with those
which already exist within the MMP. To compare IMADwith these
solutions, we adopted the following protocol.We used half ofD1 as
the initial content (yet published apps, noted Asafepubed) of the MMP.
The set of apps playing the role of submitted apps consists of
the other half of D1 (noted A
safe
pub) on the one hand and all apps
in D2 (noted A
illeg
pub ) on the other hand. Androguard and FsQuadra
are accurate each time they are able to detect that Asafepub does not
mimic an existing app while Aillegpub does. Concerning IMAD, it is
accurate when it is able to detect the trusted entity behind the
submitted app. Fig. 11 presents the evaluation results. We can see
that all systemswork perfectly on Asafepub apps. Concerning A
illeg
pub apps,
Androguard and FSquaDRA provide poor results. This is explained
by the fact that not all Aillegpub mimic apps which are yet in the MMP.
IMAD does not suffer from this limitation since its search space is
the web. The reader should refer to the previous section in order to
have more explanations about the reported accuracy rate (81%).
For legitimate apps, we have 100% accuracy, which means that
we are always able to identify the correct entity to contact in
order to validate the submission. If this would not be the case, the
submitter could contact the MMP for its submission to be handled
manually (this would happen only for apps that have no existence
at all on the net, which is very rare). For illegitimate apps, the 20%
error rate means that (1) for 80% of these apps, we contacted the
(attacked) trusted entity which is therefore informed about the
attack and will not validate the submission, and (2) for 20% of the
apps, another (wrong) entity is contacted and will not answer or
7 The algorithmwe used is themost recent one at the time of writing this paper.
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will respond a rejection. The only threat is if an attacker is able 
to make noise on the web so that it will be more referenced than 
the trusted entity he attacks. This is a much difficult task for the 
attacker, as companies which make business with apps always 
have a communication strategy on the web. 
5.2.2. !MAD configuration parameters 
Table 2 summarizes the list of the most important parameters 
(noted L;) that IMAD uses. The last column presents the best value 
we experimentally found, as follows. For each parameter we per­
formed several experiments while increasing its value. The best 
value is the one from which the accuracy rate of the system does 
not improve. These experiments were first performed on a small 
data set and then validated on the entire data set. The smalt data set 
is disjoint from the entire data set which was used for validation. 
Fig. 12 presents the evaluation results, which justify the values 
reported in Table 2. For instance, using more than 20 documents 
(L1 ) in the text search phase does not ameliorate the accuracy rate 
of the system ( see the leftmost curve in Fig. 12 ). 
5.2.3. Evaluation of !MAD with other search engines 
We also evaluated our system with other search engines 
namely: 
• Bing (40) (from Microsoft) for appName searches.
• Tineye [41) for appLogo searches. 
appName searches with Bing. The custom and programmable 
version of Bing are fairly new. However, the results obtained with 
this system are very poor (the accuracy rate is almost nil). Sev­
era! reasons can explain these results. (1) Bing's ranking does not 
Fig. 12. Configuration parameters: estimation of the best value.
provide relevant documents at the top. (2) Its API does not allow 
the specification of the search scope. For instance, it is not possi-
ble to enforce a dbPedia search for determining trusted entities. 
Therefore, although the web search returns some results, it is not 
possible to classify those which are related to a trusted entity. (3) 
Small and medium-sized enterprises are almost never found. For 
these reasons, Bing is not mature enough to be used by IMAD.
appLogo searches with Tineye. We have also tested Tineye [41] 
as the reverse image search system. We have made the following 
observations. (1) The Tineye search latency is too high (up to 10 s) 
in comparison with Google (up to 2 s). (2) Tineye does not imple-
ment a ranking system. Therefore, the entity popularity is not taken 
into account. In order words, the search of a popular entity’s logo 
(such as Facebook) will not necessarily return Facebook’s website 
at the top of the list. However, this system represents an acceptable 
alternative for Google.
5.3. Complexity
This section presents an analysis of the complexity of our ap-
proach. It is divided into two parts: local processing and global 
latency.
5.3.1. Local processing
We consider here the computations on data obtained from 
remote sources (google and DBpedia). We present separately the 
complexities of the text search and image search algorithms.
The text search algorithm mainly depends on the number m 
of documents obtained during the first google engine search. It 
includes the processing of the collected web pages to build a corpus 
(Section 4.5) whose complexity is O (m), clustering (Section 4.6) 
based on Kmeans with a complexity tending towards O (m ˆ  (k + 1)), 
with k being the number of obtained topics which is generally not 
more than 5. This step is followed by the elimination of unneces-
sary clusters (Section 4.7) with a complexity O (mnwTN) + 0 (mn-
NwAM) with n being the number of words in the dictionary, w the 
average number of wiki concepts relating to an important word, T 
the number of words in the RCL, N the number of important words, 
A the number of words in the abstract of a wiki concept and M the 
average number of words per document obtained during the first 
search. The step of eliminating useless documents (Section 4.8) has 
a complexity of O (wT). Finally that of the extraction of the contact 
(Section 4.9) is done in O (m). All the parameters except m being 
upper bound, the overall complexity of text search is O (m ˆ  (k + 1)).
Finally, let us note that experimentally we have determined that a 
value of m > 20, does not improve the accuracy of the results.
The image search algorithm consists in the construction of the 
corpus with a complexity O (m) and the clustering and the determi-
nation of the topic whose complexity is O (m ˆ  (k + 1)) + O (mnwTN)
+ 0 (mnNwAM). The step of searching for the logo in the selected 
documents has a complexity of O (m) and that of comparison of 
the logos O (xmI) with x the number of logos retained for each 
document and I the complexity of the logo comparison algorithm. 
The sorting of the selected logos is done in O (m log(m)). All this for 
a complexity tending towards O (m ˆ (k + 1)) for the same reasons 
as the complexity of text search.
The text search and image search evaluations on several appli-
cations have shown that scalability can be taken into account as 
depicted in Section 5.4.
5.3.2. Global latency
The overall latency is dominated by the time taken by each 
search on Google search engine and on DBpedia. All monetary costs 
of these searches are evaluated in Section 5.5.
5.4. Scalability
We evaluated the scalability of our system as follows. First, we 
evaluated the amount of resources consumed by each step. To this 
end, we considered three representative apps, namely: WhatsApp, 
Skype, and MPayOK (mobile money). Then we evaluated IMAD 
facing parallel checks, up to 10 apps at the same time (Google Play 
receives about one app every minute [42], thus checking 10 apps 
at the same time is enough). Figs. 13 and 14 present the evaluation 
results of the two experiment types respectively, interpreted as 
follows:
• (S1) consumes a non negligible amount of CPU (this is not
the case for other steps), see Fig. 13 leftmost. Its memory
consumption level depends on the size of the checked apk
(10MB–75MB in our experiments).
• When performing several checks at the same time, the pro-
cessor is the most critical resource since it saturates before
the main memory, see Fig. 14 left.
• (S2) is the step which takes themost time, see the last picture
in Fig. 13. This is because several web searches are performed
during this step.
• the average time needed to check an apk is about 38 s.
These results show that the exploitation of IMAD does not
require a particular hardware specification, even a commodity
desktop can do the job.
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5.5. Cast evaluation 
This section evaluates both the cost of deploying IMAD as an 
independent seivice (noted IMADaaS) on a commercial cloud and 
using Google search engine (which is not free). 
Public cloud utilization cosL We evaluated the cost of hosting 
IMADaaS on a public cloud, Microsoft Azure [43] in our exper­
iments. Our experimental machine (presented in Section 5.1) is 
comparable to the Azure Standard....A3 virtual machine (VM) type. 
According to (42,44], Google Play as well as Apple store receives 
about 2,000 apps every day (about one per minute). Therefore, a 
single Standard....A3 instance would be able to check within one 
minute the apks coming from up to five MMPs similar to Google 
Play and App store. This results to a bill of about $1571.28 per year. 
Web search engine utilization cosc. The number of searches 
(noted ns) needed by IMADaaS for checking an apk is given by the 
following formula: 
ns = n + k x m + 2 x d + n x d (6) 
where n is the number of items in the corpus, k is the number of 
clusters, m is the maximum number of important words, d is the 
number of documents retained for the second chance step. ln the 
case of our experiments, we found the following values: n=20, k=3, 
m=3, and d=4, resulting tons = 117. We evaluated the cost of using 
Google custom search engine. The cost of a search in the latter is 
$0.0075, leading to $0.8775 the cost of checking an apk. Therefore, 
the cost for checking ail daily apk from Google Play store or Apple 
store is about $1,755. 
6. Conclusion
This paper presents !MAD, a security system capable to identify 
attackers who deploy malicious mobile applications in the name 
of well-known public companies which have not deployed their 
mobile app yet. The IMAD strength lies in the following. The at­
tacker may distort the application label (name, logo) so that it 
will cheat the detection system (the search engine). However, the 
label will be distorted in such a way that it is not able to foot 
the user anymore. We evaluated !MAD with up to 5000 enter­
prises, covering ail enterprise categories (geographical location, 
activity, etc.). The evaluation results showed that !MAD can protect 
both big, medium and small-sized companies with an accuracy 
rate greater that 80%. We also compared IMAD with two systems 
(Androguard and FsQuadra). The evaluation results showed that 
IMAD does better as these systems for classical attacks white they 
were not able to detect the new attack discussed in this paper. The 
evaluation results also showed that our system is able to check ail 
apps deployed within a day on Google Play or Apple App Store at a 
minimal cost (about $1,755). 
This work opens many perspectives and it is worth mentioning 
some of them. First, the success of this approach depends on the 
ability to extract the correct email address of the person supposed 
to validate the application submission. This ability is dilficult to 
experimentally evaluate and if it frequently faits, it would lead 
to a significant rate of app rejection. Alternatives to this scheme 
can be investigated. For instance, the submitter could provide 
an email address and IMAD would verify that this email address 
complies with the company it has identified, e.g. complies with 
the DNS domain of that company. One may see a contradiction 
with footnote 5 in Section 3.1 which argues that we do not trust 
the submitter. However, if  he provides us with an email address 
and the domain name of this address is that of the trusted entity 
found by IMAD, the search for the contact can be bypassed and the 
system can directly send him the validation email. For example, if 
the given submitter address is submitterO@orange.com, and !MAD 
finds orange as the trusted entity of the application with the 
orange.corn domain name, we are certain that the developer of the 
application is an employee of Orange and we will directly send 
him the validation email. Note that this scheme is secure as long 
as it is impossible to spoof a domain name. Another perspective 
is the integration of additional alphabets (we only experimented 
with Latin and Mandarin in this paper) which would improve the 
accuracy of lMAD. We can also consider using the app's description 
in our web search for the trusted entity to improve its accuracy. 
Finally, we are considering is the integration of a cache system 
which would allow to reduce the costs (in terms of time and 
money) of web searches. 
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